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ABSTRACT
The replicability crisis has drawn attention to numerous weaknesses in psychol-
ogy and social science research practice. In this work we focus on three issues
that deserve more attention: The use of models with limited functional form, the
use of misspecified causal models, and unreliable interpretation of results. We
demonstrate a number of possible consequences via simulation, and provide rec-
ommendations for researchers to improve their research practice. We believe it
is extremely important to encourage psychologists and social scientists to engage
with the debate surrounding areas of possible analytical and statistical improve-
ments, particularly given that these shortfalls have the potential to seriously hinder
scientific progress. Every research question and hypothesis may present its own
unique challenges, and it is only through an awareness and understanding of var-
ied statistical methods for predictive and causal modeling, that researchers will
have the tools with which to appropriately address them.
INTRODUCTION
Meta-researchers have increasingly drawn attention to the replicability crisis affecting psychology
and social science (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Botella & Duran, 2019; Aarts et al., 2015;
Stevens, 2017; Marsman et al., 2017; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018; Yarkoni, 2019). A key element of
the crisis relates to common and fundamentally problematic analytic and statistical practices, some
of which deserve more attention. These problematic practices relate to observational research and
modeling in psychology and social science, and may be broadly categorized as issues with (1) the
use of statistical/predictive models with limited functional form; (2) the misspecification of causal
models; and (3) unreliable interpretations of predictive or causal models. All of these issues affect
a researcher’s ability to accurately model some aspect of the joint distribution of the data, for the
purpose of predicting an outcome, estimating a causal effect, and drawing scientific conclusions.
The first issue relates to the ubiquitous use of linear models, and a failure to consider more powerful,
possibly data-adaptive techniques for both predictive and causal modeling. The second relates to the
use of misspecified implicit (e.g. multiple linear regression) or explicit (e.g., structural equation)
causal models which do not sufficiently reflect the true structure in the data. The final issue relates
both to how predictive models are often (mis)interpreted as causal models, and vice versa, and also
to how these interpretations are likely to be unreliable given the models’ underlying limitations and
assumptions.
We address the three issues in turn through both didactic illustration and simulation, and make a
number of recommendations for improving research practice. While these issues relating to re-
search practice have been previously discussed (e.g., see Claesen et al. 2019; Scheel et al. in press),
we believe it is extremely important to continue to encourage and stimulate consideration and en-
gagement with the debate surrounding areas of possible analytical improvement. Furthermore, in
spite of researchers having already made important recommendations for improving practice (e.g.,
Lakens et al. 2016; Scheel et al. in press; Gigerenzer 2018; Jostmann et al. 2016; Lakens & Evers
2014; Orben & Lakens 2020) we see relatively little change in the research communities of psychol-
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ogy and social science (Claesen et al., 2019; Scheel et al., in press). In general, it would seem that
researchers in psychology and social science lack some competence in the practice of prediction
and causal inference, and these shortfalls have the potential to seriously affect the reliability and
interpretation of research and therefore to hinder scientific progress.
Following a review of the literature, the paper is split into three main parts. In Part 1, we describe
how the typical models used in psychology are limited by their functional form and discuss the im-
plications of this issue and possible ways to address it. Part 2 is concerned with misspecification
in causal modeling, and how the typical models used in psychology and social science do not ad-
equately reflect the true structure of the data. We discuss how this impacts interpretability, how a
consideration for causal structure is essential when designing a model, and we identify some chal-
lenges associated with undertaking causal modeling. Part 3 introduces the notion of explainability
as an alternative to interpretation, and as a means of deriving insight from predictive models. We
discuss interpretation, considering the relevant points on limited functional form and misspecifica-
tion covered in Parts 1 and 2, and discuss how interpretations in psychology and social science tend
to be a conflation of causal and predictive interpretations. Finally, we conclude this work with a dis-
cussion and by proposing four recommendations for improving practice. A table of relevant terms
and their working definitions is provided for convenience in Table 1.
Table 1: Basic working definitions.
Approach Relating closely to the hypothesis/research question, it describes the broad intention
behind research methodology, analysis, and interpretation.
Model Part of the approach, it is the mathematical relationship between variables, as reflected
in the algorithm or technique used for analysis. It may be predictive or causal, or a
hybrid.
Predictive The “study of the association between variables or the identification of the variables
which contribute to the prediction of another variable” (Blanca et al., 2018). The word
“association” here alludes to the fact that the associations or relationships between vari-
ables are not necessarily causal. Prediction may help us to answer questions such as
‘when?’, ‘which?’, and ‘how much?’.
Causal The study of cause-effect relationships between variables, which facilitates understand-
ing and answers questions such as such as ‘why?’, ‘how?’, and ‘what if?’ (Pearl, 2009)
Functional
Form
The nature of the mathematical function describing the relationship between variables.
Misspecification When a causal model does not sufficiently reflect the causal structure of the data to
render a causal effect identifiable (due to limited functional form and/or incorrect causal
structure), the model is misspecified.
BACKGROUND
A recent article titled ‘Declines in religiosity predict increases in violent crime - but not among coun-
tries with relatively high average IQ’ was retracted from the Journal of Psychological Science on the
basis of methodological weaknesses and political sensitivity. The Editor in Chief at the time, Steve
Lindsay apologized on multiple grounds, and stated that “In terms of science, Clark et al. may not be
worse than some other articles published in Psych Science during my editorship...” (Lindsay, 2020).
This may suggest that methodological weakness, as described in terms of “blurred distinctions be-
tween psychological constructs versus measures and speculations/extrapolations far removed from
the data” is somewhat par for the course in the “young science” (Lindsay, 2020) of psychology.
Indeed, over the last ten years, meta-researchers have drawn increasing attention to a purported cri-
sis in the human sciences (particularly psychology) known as the replication crisis. The crisis has
been discussed at length by many different meta-researchers (e.g., Oberauer & Lewandowsky 2019;
Botella & Duran 2019; Aarts et al. 2015; Stevens 2017; Marsman et al. 2017; Shrout & Rodgers
2018; Yarkoni 2019) who argue that research in the human sciences fails to replicate. For example,
only six out of 53 landmark cancer studies were found to replicate (Begley & Ellis, 2012), and be-
tween one third and one half of 100 psychology studies in top-ranking journals could be replicated
(Aarts et al., 2015; Marsman et al., 2017).
One positive outcome of the widespread awareness of the replicability crisis is the fact that atten-
tion has been drawn to many questionable, suboptimal, or problematic aspects associated with the
research procedure in general. Indeed, it is only by recognition of these issues, and engagement in
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relevant constructive debate, that research practice can be improved. A wide range of contributing
factors to this crisis have been highlighted and discussed, and include: A lack of understanding
about and misuse of p-values and statistical tests (Cassidy et al., 2019; Gigerenzer, 2018; 2004;
Colquhoun, 2014; 2017; 2019; McShane et al., 2019); issues relating to the testing of theory (Ober-
auer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Muthukrishna & Henric, 2017); immature theories (Scheel et al., in
press); misunderstandings about statistical power and low sample sizes (Sassenberg & Ditrich, 2019;
Baker et al., 2020; Correll et al., 2020); measurement problems (Flake & Fried, in press); a lack of
meta-analyses (Schmidt & Oh, 2016); a lack of assumptions testing (Ernst & Albers, 2017); pressure
to publish (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018); double-dipping and overfitting (Kassraian-Fard et al., 2016;
Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Mayo, 2013; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017); a failure to consider the conse-
quences of aggregation and non-ergodicity (Fisher et al., 2018; Peters & Werner, 2017); academia
and research being a strategy game with unscientific incentives (Gigerenzer, 2018; DeDeo, 2020);
a reluctance of journals to publish replications (Martin & Clarke, 2017; Gernsbacher, 2019); issues
with the peer review process (Heesen & Bright, 2020); reporting errors (Nuijten et al., 2016); a lack
of research practice standardization (Tong, 2019); overly generous claims and warped interpreta-
tions (Yarkoni, 2019; Spellman, 2015; Scheel et al., in press); the conflation of predictive and causal
approaches and interpretations (Grosz et al., 2020; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Shmueli, 2010); and
general scientific misconduct (Stricker & Gu¨nther, 2019).
More specifically, meta-researchers have highlighted how psychologists and social scientists tend
to mix causal and predictive language (Grosz et al., 2020). For instance, in a select review of psy-
chology literature, Grosz et al. (2020) explain how “some parts of the articles read as if the entire
endeavor were noncausal; yet other parts make sense only in the context of trying to answer a causal
research question”. Similarly, meta-researchers have drawn attention to how it is common for psy-
chology and social science researchers to use associational/predictive techniques to test otherwise
causal hypotheses (Shmueli, 2010; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Glymour, 1998; Hernan, 2018a; Grosz
et al., 2020). Shmueli (2010) explains how “the type of statistical models used for testing causal hy-
potheses in the social sciences are almost always association-based [i.e., predictive] models.” One
can only surmise the possible causes behind this tendency for conflation, but it may relate to the
controversial history of causal inference in observational social science and psychology. The con-
flation may stem from the conflict between recognizing the importance of asking causal questions,
without wanting to be seen to be actually using causal methods with observational data. Indeed, the
literature on causality in psychology and social science has been described as “one of the oddest
literatures in all of academia” (Dowd, 2011), and researchers in these fields are notoriously reluctant
to adopt appropriate modeling techniques (Grosz et al., 2020; Hernan, 2018a). Others have mocked
the reluctance to undertake causal inference in psychology and the social sciences by referring to
causality as “the C-word” (Hernan, 2018a;b), and others refer to its use as “taboo” (Grosz et al.,
2020). Indeed, Grosz et al. (2020) explain how causal modeling is only undertaken “implicitly,
opaquely, and without an articulation of the underlying assumptions”. The result has been a ten-
dency to use predictive language such as ‘associations’, ‘links, ‘correlations’, ‘relationships’, and
to avoid causal language such as ‘causes’, ‘impacts’, ‘effects’ despite designing their models and
experiments on the basis of well considered theories about the causal structure of the phenomenon
of interest (Shmueli, 2010).
In addition to a general reluctance to adopt clearly articulated causal approaches, one might also
argue that the various manifestations of conflation indicate a lack of understanding about the differ-
ences between predictive and causal modeling (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Shmueli, 2010; Grosz
et al., 2020). For example, there is a relatively well established modeling technique known as
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) which explicitly encodes causal structure (Kline, 2005; Blanca
et al., 2018). The point to note about the use of SEM in psychology and social science is that the
way the technique is often presented and interpreted obfuscates its causal nature (Grosz et al., 2020).
This leads to an awkward conflation of causal modeling with predictive interpretations, resulting in
ambiguity and a lack of clarity regarding intentions and assumptions. It may be that researchers are
unaware that their SEMs are explicitly causal and fail to sufficiently understand how the results from
the analysis are underpinned by a number of restrictive (and often untestable) assumptions.
There is also evidence of a possible lack of understanding relating to the use of predictive models in
psychology and social science. Yarkoni & Westfall (2017) provide a number of examples of where
researchers seem to have clearly identified that they are adopting a predictive approach but use sub-
optimal and misguided predictive modeling practice and models which lack predictive power. A
3
Preprint
wide range of powerful predictive modeling techniques exist, including neural networks (Goodfel-
low et al., 2016), random forests (Breiman, 2001b), gradient boosting machines (Chen & Guestrin,
2016) etc., many of which derive from developments in machine learning. In spite of the abundance
of available options, researchers in psychology and social science most often employ simple lin-
ear models when undertaking predictive /associational research (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Blanca
et al., 2018). The assumption of linear functional form is often restrictive and has been previously
noted to be problematic (van der Laan & Rose, 2011; Asuero et al., 2006; Onwuegbuzie & Daniel,
1999; Achen, 1977; King, 1986; Meehl, 1990; Taleb, 2019) and frequently ignored (Ernst & Albers,
2017). Furthermore, some researchers seem to be unaware of certain basic principles relating to pre-
dictive (as well as causal) research, such as those relating to overfitting (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017;
Bishop, 2006; Heman & Slep, 2001) and ‘double-dipping’ (Kassraian-Fard et al., 2016; Kriegesko-
rte et al., 2009; Mayo, 2013). Overfitting and double-dipping refer to modeling (mis)practices which
increase the fit of a model to the specific data sample being used, and which negatively impact the
validity and generalizability of results. Indeed, any modeling decision that affects the parameters
of the model based on information from the same data sample with which the model is validated
results in overfitting, biased effect sizes, and the inflation of p-values and other performance metrics
(Bishop, 2006; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Heman & Slep, 2001). Regardless of whether a researcher
is undertaking a predictive or causal approach, overfitting inflates the apparent success of the map-
ping function at the expense of generalizability to new samples, and has been argued to be a major
contributor to the current replicability crisis (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018; Gelman & Loken, 2013).
PART 1: LIMITED FUNCTIONAL FORM - MODELING RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN VARIABLES
In this part we address certain issues that may arise when using modeling techniques that have lim-
ited functional form. When we refer to the functional form of a model as being limited we mean
that the model does not have the flexibility to sufficiently reflect the complexity of the relationship
between variables, possibly resulting in poor predictive ability and biased results. Identifying or
deriving an adequately flexible functional form with which to model the relationship between vari-
ables, in circumstances where causal relationships are not of concern, is somewhat synonymous with
the task of prediction. As such, the majority of this section will be written with consideration of its
relevance to predictive modeling, where the goal is to learn a function that optimally maps predictor
variables to outcome variables. However, a consideration for functional form is just as important
for causal modeling, for which we may be tasked with embedding models representing the relation-
ships between variables into a larger model representing the causal structure of the data generating
process. For purposes of prediction alone, it suffices to be solely concerned with finding the optimal
mapping function to achieve some desired level of predictive performance. We expect models that
reflect the structure of reality to also be good predictors, but this is not necessarily the case the other
way around; good predictive functions do not necessarily reflect the structure of reality.
We begin by introducing some of the technical formalism behind predictive modeling, and briefly
list some of its wide ranging applications. Following this, we discuss the limitations of undertaking
prediction using the two most common and basic methods used in psychology and social science:
Correlation and linear regression models. We demonstrate how these methods, in the basic form
adopted in psychology and social science, are fundamentally limited in their ability to account for
non-linearities present in the data. This motivates a need for more flexible, powerful, potentially
data-adaptive predictive methods. Previous research has highlighted that the use of such techniques
is rare in psychology and social science, where it is much more usual to use models with restrictive
linear functional form (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Blanca et al., 2018). Linear functions may be
useful to consider for their computational efficiency and for their tendency to naturally under-fit the
data, thereby improving generalization particularly when the quantity of data is limited. However,
these factors are not sufficient to fully explain the rarity of non-linear, powerful, and/or data adaptive
techniques in psychology and social science, and we posit that a possible lack of awareness of these
alternative methods is more likely.
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APPLICATIONS AND BASIC FORMALISM
The topic of identifying the optimal functional form with which to represent the relationship be-
tween variables is vast and well covered by many authors, particularly those in the field of machine
learning in the context of prediction (Bishop, 2006; Duda et al., 2001; Murphy, 2012). Prediction
has been described as “the study of the association between variables or the identification of the
variables which contribute to the prediction of another variable” (Blanca et al., 2018) and therefore
relates closely to the more general task of identifying the optimal function that maps between sets
of variables. The applications for predictive models are wide ranging, and include personalized
medicine (Rahbar et al., 2020), time series forecasting (Makridakis et al., 2020), facial and object
recognition (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Jonsson et al., 2000), and many others. Such techniques are
therefore extremely valuable and influential in shaping our modern world.
The basic formalism for predictive modeling is as follows: Researchers may be confronted with a
dataset comprising samples from a population (xi,yi) ∈ X ×Y . In words, we have a set of samples
of predictors or random variables1, which take on values in the set X and which are related to some
outcome variables2 which take on values in the set Y . If the outcome is binary or categorical, the task
of prediction becomes equivalent to one of classification. The goal of prediction usually involves
finding a mapping function f : X → Y . We will use the terms predictive function and predictive
model to refer to the mapping function used to make predictions.
THE COMMON ASSUMPTION OF LINEAR FUNCTIONAL FORM
Variations on simple measures of correlation and linear models (including linear SEMs) were found
to be the most frequently used modeling techniques in psychology research in recent years (Blanca
et al., 2018; Bolger et al., 2019).3 The principal assumption associated with these models is that the
true relationships between the variables are sufficiently represented as linear. Such models therefore
have a limited functional form that can only represent linear relationships. In other words, they
describe relationships between predictor and outcome variables that can be summarized in terms of
a weighted sum. Of course, in reality the true relationships between variables may be highly complex
and nonlinear. Indeed, assuming our dataset is sampled from a ‘true’ population distribution, there
exists a ‘true’ functional form describing the functional relationships between the variables. Figure
1 illustrates how traditional methods (including linear regression) have the most limited capacity
(owing to strong restrictions on the functional form) to model complex real-world phenomena (Coyle
et al., 2020; van der Laan & Rose, 2018; van der Laan & Starmans, 2014).
Correlation is generally used to measure the association or statistical dependence between variables
(i.e., to identify variables which may be good predictors). As one of the most common ways to
measure dependence, there are two important aspects relating to correlation to bear in mind. Figure
2 shows a number of bivariate distributions along with their correlation coefficient. The first thing
to note from the upper six plots is that correlation itself is a non-linear metric for dependence.
Lower values of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) are associated with a disproportionately
lower dependence than higher values (and this is also reflected visually in the plots). The second
thing to note from the lower four plots is that the PCC catastrophically fails to capture non-linear
dependence.
The first issue is important for researchers to understand when drawing conclusions about relative
levels of correlation. For example, the difference between PCC = 0.1 and PCC = 0.2 is less dra-
matic than, say the difference between PCC = 0.8 and PCC = 0.9, in spite of the former describ-
ing a much higher proportionate increase. The second issue relates to an assumption of linearity:
If the relationship between the two variables is linear, then correlation provides a measure of linear
1These variables are sometimes called ‘independent variables’, but due to the fact that they are usually
non-independent, we avoid this potentially unhelpful terminology.
2These variables are sometimes called ‘dependent variables’, but due to the fact that many dependencies
exist we also avoid this terminology.
3It might be argued that any arbitrary function can be represented as some linear sum of features, and
that therefore all models are fundamentally linear. However, using such a broadly encompassing definition
of the term ‘linear model’ makes discussion pedantic. As such, we use the term to describe the typical linear
regression model where the outcome is modeled as a linear sum of raw variables or low-order functions of these
variables (such as exponents: x1,x2; and interactions: x1x2 etc.).
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Figure 1: Approximating Realistic Data Distributions
Traditional
Methods
Realistic
True
Machine Learning
Note. Traditional techniques such as linear regression may be severely limited in their capacity to model
highly complex, non-linear data. Machine Learning methods may help to expand the coverage of realistic data
distributions, but the true distribution may still lie outside. Combining flexible function approximation
techniques from machine learning, with an incorporation of domain knowledge and model structure, can help
us get as close as possible to modelling the true data distribution (van der Laan & Rose, 2011).
dependence; if the relationship is non-linear, then correlation may provide meaningless measures of
dependence. In cases where the relationship is non-linear, researchers will need to either linearize
the relationship (e.g., by creating a new variable that accounts for this non-linearity), or consider
using an alternative measure of dependence. One such alternative to correlation is Shannon Mutual
Information (M.I.), which gives us a measure for how much information one variable contains about
another (Cover & Thomas, 2006; Kraskov et al., 2004; Steeg & Galstyan, 2012; 2013; Gao et al.,
2015; Kinney & Atwal, 2014). The estimates for M.I. are also shown in Figure 2, and it can be seen
that M.I. not only handles non-linear relationships between variables, but also increases linearly
with the degree of dependence of the variables. Note that M.I. ranges between [0, H] whereH is the
entropy of either distribution when the two distributions are identical (i.e., I(x,y) = H(x) = H(y)
when x = y).4 M.I. cannot be negative, and as such it is not able to indicate the ‘direction’ of the
association in the way that correlation can. However, this is an acceptable limitation given that many
non-linear relationships are non-monotonic (i.e. they are not always either increasing or decreasing)
and in such cases a notion of positive or negative direction is unhelpful.
Linear regression is another very common modeling technique used for both predictive and causal
modeling and constitute a relatively small sub-class in the class of Generalized Linear Models.
There is one principal assumption for linear regression which is important for achieving both suc-
cessful causal and predictive modeling. Namely, that the outcome can be well approximated using
a weighted linear sum of the input variables. Indeed, the linearity imposes a strong functional con-
straint that restricts the function’s flexibility and is, therefore, an assumption about functional form
(van der Laan & Rose, 2011). Linear methods are unlikely to match the functional form of realistic
data distributions, and to get closer to the true functional form, researchers should consider using
more flexible predictive methods.
IMPROVING ON THE FUNCTIONAL FORM OF LINEAR MODELS
In order to improve the predictive or associational performance of a predictive function, researchers
may need to explore either feature engineering approaches, or other functional approximation tech-
niques such as those commonly used in machine learning. Introducing hierarchical structure within
linear functions can improve the fit (Yarkoni, 2019; Gelman & Hill, 2007; Bolger et al., 2019), but
even hierarchical linear models are constrained according to linear functional associations.
Feature engineering involves the substitution of raw input variables with functions of these raw vari-
ables called features. Depending on the functional form used to derive these features, the features
themselves may then be linearly related to the outcome, facilitating better overall functional approx-
imation. For instance, researchers may include more exotic basis functions such (e.g., sinusoidal
functions; Vowels et al. 2018, or kernels; Scholkopf 2019), or simply combine features to form new
4Readers are pointed to Cover & Thomas (2006) for an introduction to information theoretic concepts such
as entropy and mutual information.
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Figure 2: Pearson Correlation and Shannon Mutual Information.
Note. Simulations demonstrating the relationships between the Pearson measure of correlation, and the Mutual
Information metric for measuring statistical dependence. The upper six plots depict linear bivariate
relationships, whereas the lower four plots are non-linear.
ones (e.g., interaction features which are composed by multiplying two variables together). Feature
engineering may thereby help to account for the non-linearities of the data in the features them-
selves, but in doing so, each feature may need to be carefully chosen or designed. For example, in
Figure 2, the plot in the third row on the right has a simple basis function which is x2. While the
raw values of x could not be used to model the outcome as part of a linear sum, the squared values
could be used to essentially linearize the predictor in question. However, in real-world applications
(i.e., research scenarios with real data) we will not know the functional form a priori and it may
be difficult to ascertain. For instance, the function may not be an exact quadratic function x2, but
some other, arbitrarily complex function. The feature engineering process may or may not be guided
by knowledge about the domain of interest. For example, in the case of a time series with known
seasonal variation (e.g., financial data exhibiting fluctuation due to the business cycle) the use of
sinusoidal basis functions may be well justified and aid prediction and generalization (Hamilton,
1994; Vowels et al., 2018).
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Besides generalized linear models with feature engineering, there exist many alternative and much
more powerful function approximation techniques, such as those common in machine learning.
These techniques are able to learn functional relationships from the data themselves and can be
used instead of, or in combination with, feature engineering. For instance, random forests (Breiman,
2001b) comprise a group of decision trees that are capable of learning highly non-linear relation-
ships and interactions between variables, without these interactions needing to be pre-specified. The
mapping learned by the forest adapts to the data in order to minimize a performance objective (e.g.,
mean squared error). One of the advantages of random forests is that they employ bootstrapping
and thereby mitigate problems with learned functions overfitting the data. Neural networks are an
alternative approach to function approximation which are also data-adaptive and are highly param-
eterized (Goodfellow et al., 2016). They learn by iteratively updating their parameters according to
an error signal until some criterion for convergence is met. An example of predictions from a simple
neural network compared with those of a linear regressor on a bivariate problem is shown in Figure
3. It can be seen the neural network has fit the data almost perfectly, whilst the linear regression
approximates the mean slope of the line, ignoring the cycling fluctuation. While prior knowledge
may enable one to employ sinusoidal basis functions with linear regression in order to achieve a
similar degree of fit, the advantage with neural networks is that such prior feature engineering is not
required, and any arbitrary function can be approximated (Hornik et al., 1989).
Figure 3: Neural network versus linear regression function predictions.
Note. Demonstrates how linear functional forms cannot capture the non-linear relationships. In contrast,
non-linear, data-adaptive techniques such as neural networks, can.
OVERFITTING AND DOUBLE-DIPPING
As described previously overfitting and double-dipping refer to the consequences of various model-
ing practices which increase the fit of a model to a specific data sample, but which negatively impact
the validity and generalizability of results. An awareness of overfitting becomes increasingly crucial
when attempting to model non-linear functional relationships between variables. Overfitting and
double-dipping have been extensively covered elsewhere, particularly in the machine learning liter-
ature (where overfitting is sometimes associated with what is known as the bias-variance trade-off)
(Belkin et al., 2019; Bishop, 2006; Murphy, 2000; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017; Mayo, 2013). Prior
research has highlighted how modeling practices that result in overfitting are common in psychol-
ogy and social science, as well as a number of other fields, and have been noted for their possible
contribution to the replicability crisis (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018; Gelman & Loken, 2013; Yarkoni &
Westfall, 2017). Even the common forward and backward method for variable inclusion constitutes
data-driven overfitting practices which have the potential to significantly impact model generaliz-
ability and interpretability, and yet these practices are routinely included as part of standard statistical
education and practice in psychology (e.g., see Field (2009)). We mention such (mis)practice again
here because, when using powerful function approximation techniques, a consideration for overfit-
ting is even more important. There are numerous techniques for mitigating issues with overfitting,
including regularization, cross-validation, train-test splits etc. and it is important that researchers in
8
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psychology and social science familiarize themselves with these fundamental concepts, especially
when accounting for complex, non-linear associations between variables.
PART 1 SUMMARY
In Part 1, we presented how models with limited functional form may be unable to represent the
complex relationships between variables. The typical analyses used in psychology and social sci-
ence include simple measures of correlation, and various manifestations of linear regression. While
such modeling techniques are limited in their predictive capacity, there are many algorithms used
in the field of machine learning which can learn an appropriately flexible functional form from the
data themselves. When using more powerful techniques, it is especially important to validate mod-
els on an out-of-sample test set (e.g., by using a cross-validation method, or train/test splitting) in
order to avoid overfitting. However, it is worth noting that overfitting (and the related problem of
double-dipping) is also possible with simple linear models, and prior meta-research suggests that
researchers may be unaware of these issues. Finally, the rarity of modeling techniques with power-
ful, data-adaptive functional form represents a possible missed opportunity in psychology and social
science, and we encourage researchers to consider the functional form of their models, and famil-
iarize themselves with the associated pitfalls and limitations (e.g., overfitting), in order that they can
get closer to modeling the true relationships underpinning the phenomenon under study.
PART 2: CAUSAL/STRUCTURAL MISSPECIFICATION
As described in the Introduction, prior research has highlighted a reluctance to adopt explicit causal
approaches (Grosz et al., 2020; Hernan, 2018a). Causal techniques provide the means to answer
fundamental questions that help us to develop an understanding of the world (Pearl, 2009; van der
Laan & Rose, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of a well-established theory
in psychology or social science which does not incorporate at least some level of consideration for
cause and effect, and, if there is one, we would question its utility in so far as it can help us under-
stand the world. Models which sufficiently align with the structure of reality may facilitate causal
inference, even with observational (as opposed to experimental) data (Glymour, 2001; Pearl, 2009;
Pearl et al., 2016; Grosz et al., 2020) and have wide ranging applications including advertisement
(Bottou et al., 2013), policy making (Kreif & DiazOrdaz, 2019), the evaluation of evidence within
legal frameworks (Pearl, 2009; Siegerink et al., 2016), and the development of medical treatments
(Petersen et al., 2017; van der Laan & Rose, 2011). There are a number of challenges associated
with adopting a causal approach.
Misspecification represents one of the principal challenges associated with causal inference, and
arises when the true causal structure and/or the functional form of the relationships between variables
in the data generating process are not sufficiently reflected in a causal model. Misspecification
results in biased effect size estimates which are not meaningfully interpretable. In this Part, we
primarily focus on misspecification stemming from problems associated with structure and to do so,
we consider misspecfication in restricted linear settings. As we will show, even in this restricted
setting, it is extremely important that the model sufficiently accounts for the true structure of the
data in order that the resulting model is interpretable. This section is not intended as a technical
guide to undertaking causal inference in general (for more information on causal inference see e.g.,
Pearl 2009; Petersen et al. 2017; Pearl et al. 2016; Glymour 2001; Angrist & Krueger 2001; Rubin
2005; Gelman & Hill 2007).
RECOVERING CAUSAL EFFECTS
Given the frequency with which psychologists and social scientists adopt linear regression methods
to test causal theories (Shmueli, 2010; Blanca et al., 2018), it is extremely important that researchers
understand the structural bias associated with the use of such models. In this section, we demonstrate
how typical linear regression models used in psychology and social science impose a strong implicit
causal/structural form which is unlikely to reflect the true causal structure of the data, even when
the functional form is linear, and are therefore likely to be misspecified. We show that, through a
consideration of the causal structure of the phenomenon under study, one can nonetheless use linear
regression to recover causal effects under a number of restrictive assumptions.
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Figure 4: Simple Directed Acyclic Graphs
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Note. Example causal Directed Acyclic Graphs (c-DAGs). Example (a) depicts the case where all ‘predictor’
or causal variables are exogenous (i.e., they have no causal parents and are independent of each other). This
corresponds with the causal structure of a simple multiple regression, where the dependent outcome y is a linear
sum of the x variables. The empirical causal effect of each variable is equivalent to the multiple regression
coefficient estimates. Example (b) is adapted from Peters et al. 2017. Example (c) depicts a graph with an
unobserved confounding variable z.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITHOUT MISSPECIFICATION
In this section we demonstrate the strong, implicit structural form associated with multiple regres-
sion. We begin by demonstrating that multiple linear regression (in its basic form) is not misspecified
with respect to the true data generating process when all predictors are exogenous (see structure in
Figure 4(a)). In such a scenario, the resulting model is interpretable.
If the true data generating process could be described as a weighted sum of a set of input variables,
then our goal of prediction within the Ordinary Least Squares multiple linear regression framework
would also be adequate for causal modeling, causal parameter estimation, or causal inference. Such a
model might be depicted graphically as in Figure 4(a). In this scenario, there would exist parameters
θ∗ (also known as effect sizes) which represent the true causal parameters, and our OLS-derived
parameters would represent empirical/sample estimations thereof.
The graphs in Figure 4 are known as causal Directed Acyclic Graphs (c-DAGs), and they represents
a generalization of the graphical representation often used in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)
(Pearl, 2009; Koller & Friedman, 2009; Rohrer, 2018). The arrows indicate causal directional re-
lationships between variables, parameterized by θ, and the grey nodes indicate observed variables.
The acyclicity pertains to the restriction that there can be no closed loops (i.e., feedback) in the
graph. Graph terminology (e.g., ‘parent’, ‘ancestor’, ‘descendant’, ‘child’) is useful in describing
the top-level relationships between variables. For example, a node with an incoming arrow is a child
of its parent variable, and further upstream or downstream variables are ancestors or descendants
respectively.
In general, the arrows in a c-DAG indicate causal dependencies, and there is no implied functional
form that prescribes how the variables are combined at a node (i.e., there could be highly non-linear,
adaptive functions with interactions). Furthermore, the nodes represent variables which may or may
not be univariate or parametric. In other words, a node labelled x does not restrict the dimensional-
ity or (non-)parameterization of x itself. For instance, a node x could comprise multiple predictors
which do not conform to a parameterized distribution. Hence, c-DAGs encode the fundamental
essence of the causal structure, without imposing potentially irrelevant restrictions. We have in-
cluded some extra information in the c-DAG of Figure 4(a) for the sake of demonstration. This
particular c-DAG represents the intercept parameter of a multiple linear regression as a vector of
ones multiplied by the parameter θ∗0 . The structural equations for this graph may be represented in
Equation 1:
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xk=0 := 1
xk := Uk(0, 1) for k = 1, ..., (K − 1)
y :=
K−1∑
k=0
θ∗kxk +Uy(0, 1) for k = 0, ..., (K − 1)
(1)
Let us assume that Uk and Uy are N -dimensional vectors of identically and independently dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) normally distributed random noise. The ‘:=’ symbol (endearingly referred to as the
walrus operator in the Python programming world) denotes assignment rather than equality. This
distinction between assignment and equality is useful in reflecting the structural/causal direction of
the arrows in the c-DAG. For example, the outcome y is a function of its inputs, and the equation
should not be rearranged to imply that the inputs are a function of the outcome (the arrows point in
one direction). Equation 1 encode the fact that all the input variables are exogenous (i.e. completely
independent of each other and determined only by i.i.d. noise) and that the outcome is determined
by a weighted linear combination of these variables. In this setting we might understandably refer
to the input variables as the independent variables, and the outcome as the dependent variable. As
mentioned, these equations correspond with a simple multiple linear regression and can be solved
to find θ using OLS. We demonstrate this by undertaking a simulation for K = 4 with θ∗0 = 3.3,
θ∗1 = 0.1, θ
∗
2 = 0.3 and θ
∗
3 = 0.5. We set N = 5000 so that we do not have to be concerned about
the stochastic variability associated with small samples, and the results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimated parameters for DAG in Figure 4(a).
θˆ0 θˆ1 θˆ2 θˆ3
y 3.31 0.11 0.31 0.50
From this demonstration it can be seen that the OLS regression successfully recovered θˆ close to
θ∗. In this case, the data generating process directly matched the model we used to estimate the
parameters and was therefore not misspecified. When there is no misspecification, the estimated
parameters may be interpreted as causal parameters that tell us about the phenomenon (in this case,
a simple, simulated phenomenon). Indeed, the parameters here can be interpreted as ‘one unit
increase in x1 yields a θ1 increase in y’, as is common practice in psychology and social science.
The interpretability of the model was only possible because the structure of the data matched the
structure of a multiple linear regression, equivalent to Figure 4(a), where all ‘predictors’ are exoge-
nous. However, this is an unrealistic scenario, and in most real-world cases, the predictors will not
be exogenous.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION - MISSPECIFIED FOR REALISTIC STRUCTURE
In the previous section we showed how a simple multiple regression can be used to recover meaning-
ful, causal parameter estimates, so long as the true causal structure of the data corresponds with the
implicit causal structure implied by the multiple regression. However, the implicit causal structure
of a linear regression is extremely restrictive and, when modeling real-world data, it is likely to be
misspecified. In this section we demonstrate what happens when such misspecification occurs.
Let us see what happens when we follow the same procedure to try to estimate some parameters for
another simple data generating process which follows the example in Figure 4(b). We assume the
following data generating structural equations (adapted from Peters et al. 2017):
x4 := U4, x2 := 0.8U2, x0 := x4 − 2x2 + 0.2U0, x1 := −2x0 + 0.5U1,
x3 := x2 + 0.1U3, x5 := 3x0 + 0.8U5, x6 := x1 + 0.5U6,
y := 2x3 − x1 + 0.2Uy, x7 := 0.5y + 0.1U7
(2)
For these equations we have simplified the notation to make things clearer: Uk ∼ N (0, 1). The
structural process is still linear and the additive noise is Gaussian, so we do not yet need to worry
about utilizing flexible function approximation techniques (such as those discussed in Part 1).
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It is worth studying these equations to understand their implications. Note that, for instance, x3 is
only determined by x2, as well as its own exogeneous noise U3. This means that, if we perform
surgery on these equations by, for example, setting x3 to a different value or distribution, we have
cut off its dependence to its parent. Such graph surgery enables us to explore a range of causal
queries such as interventions and counterfactuals, and is formalized by Pearl’s do-calculus (Pearl,
2009).
Given the simple linear form in Equation 2 for Figure 4(b), it is possible to traverse the paths in
the c-DAG and to combine the effects multiplicatively. Such a process should be familiar to those
who have studied path diagrams and SEM (Kline, 2005). For instance, the effect of x0 on y is the
multiplication of the effect of x0 → x1 with the effect of x1 → y. Together, we have the mediated
path: x0 → x1 → y. According to Equation 2 and Figure 4, the effect of x0 on y therefore
corresponds with −2 × −1 = 2. In this case, x1 is mediating the effect of x0 on y. Readers may
already be aware of the issues relating to the inclusion of mediators in a regression analysis (see
e.g., Cinelli et al. 2020; Rohrer 2018; Pearl 2009), and this is trivially demonstrated by comparing
the regressions of y onto x0 whilst (a) adjusting for x1 and (b) and not adjusting for x1. Here,
adjusting for a variable is equivalent to controlling for it, but the adjustment terminology is more
appropriate for structural scenarios (Pearl, 2009). First, the data are simulated according to Eq. 2,
with N = 5000. The bivariate correlations and p-values for each of these variables are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3: Bivariate Pearson correlations and p-values for the DAG in Figure 4(b).
r(p) x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
y .92(.00) -.92(.00) -.58(.00) -.56(.00) .76(.00) .91(.00) -.93(.00) 1.00(.00)
The results in Table 3 demonstrate a strong and statistically significant bivariate correlation between
each predictor and the outcome. Now, when only using x0 as a predictor, we estimate the effect of
x0 on y to be θˆ0 = 1.28. Recall that the true effect of x0 on y is 2. In spite of the large sample size,
the output estimate is highly biased and does not seem to correspond with any of the parameters in
the original simulation. Indeed, regardless of how large the sample size is, this coefficient estimate
will converge to a value that is far from the true estimand. This is because the structure of the data
generating process was not considered: We simply applied a linear regression to the data without
accounting for the fact that the implicit structure of a linear regression does not match the structure
in the data. In this situation, the multiple regression model might still have some limited utility as
a purely predictive function, but its parameters should not be interpreted as anything relevant to the
causal structure of the phenomenon of interest because it is misspecified.
When confronted with the dilemma of multiple observed variables, typical practice in psychology
and social science might involve using the forward or backward method for variable inclusion (Field,
2009). Besides the problems associated with such practice (i.e., potential overfitting, as described in
Part 1), including variables according to some predictive/associational heuristic is likely to result in
misspecification. Another approach might be to simply include all variables in the model. Indeed,
all the xk variables are highly and statistically significantly correlated with the outcome y, so if we
were not already aware of the implicit causal structure of linear regression, this might seem like
a sensible thing to do. When we include all variables in the model, this results in θˆ = −0.01.
Recall again that the true effect of x0 on y is 2. The estimate of −0.01 is highly biased. This is
because including all the variables in the model imposes the structure shown in Figure 4(a), where
all variables are exogenous.
Including x0 and the mediating variable x1 confirms that including mediating variables is problem-
atic: The regression including both x0 and x1 yields θˆ = −.94. As expected, the effect of x0 on
the outcome is highly biased, and of the opposite sign (i.e., negative rather than positive) to the true
causal effect. It should now be clear that the use of what might be called naive multiple regression
cannot yield meaningfully interpretable parameters unless the model corresponds with Figure 4(a),
and this is highly unlikely. Indeed, it is arguable as to whether the interpretation of this parameter
(and even its direction) is of any scientific value at all. Utilizing hierarchical or Bayesian approaches
will not help in cases where the structure of the model is misspecified.
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ADDRESSING MISSPECIFICATION USING CAUSAL INFERENCE TECHNIQUES
We have seen that using naive multiple regression is inadequate when trying to estimate a causal
effect from data with a non-trivial structure, even when the underlying functional form of the re-
lationships is linear. Even where the structure is of relatively low complexity, the resulting coeffi-
cient estimates can be wildly biased. This illustrates that, regardless of whether the functional form
matches the true functional form of the data (and in the linear simulations above, it did), it is impos-
sible to recover meaningful effect size estimations with a misspecified model. In order to recover
an unbiased estimate of the true effect, we need to understand techniques from the field of causal
inference.
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is reported to be one of the most common methods used in
psychology and social science (Blanca et al., 2018), and enables unbiased estimation of the param-
eters, so long as the structure of the SEM model matches or at least subsumes the structure of the
data generating process, and so long as a number of restrictive assumptions are met (Peters et al.,
2017). These assumptions apply to causal inference in general. The subsumption point relates to the
fact that researchers, when faced with uncertainty about the structure of the data generating process,
should choose to expand their model class rather than restrict it. In other words, researchers should,
in general, choose to include an extra arrow in their SEM rather than remove one. The choice to
expand the model allows for the possibility of a particuarl cause and effect relationship in the data,
whereas a removal of a causal link enforces an absence of dependency and thereby represents a
strong model restriction that needs to be well justified before its imposition.
Figure 5: Example Directed Acyclic Graph for Time Series
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z
y
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 …
Note. c-DAG for a time series setting, highlighting the complexity associated with identifying a particular
causal effect, especially when there may be unobserved confounding (Peters et al., 2017).
In practice, we rarely have access to the true model when we create an SEM (D‘Amour, 2019;
Wang & Blei, 2019; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2002). Indeed, as the SEM grows in complexity and/or
its causal constraints, the chance of it becoming misspecified increases. If certain assumptions are
made, and we reduce our goal to the estimation of a specific and restricted set of effects (e.g., just the
effect of x0 on y), it may be sufficient to leverage domain knowledge and causal inference techniques
to acquire a reliable estimate without having to correctly specify the full graph. Such techniques have
been extensively covered elsewhere (Peters et al., 2017; Pearl, 2009; Imbens & Rubin, 2015; Pearl
et al., 2016; Angrist & Krueger, 2001) and include the use of instrumental variables, propensity
score matching, and regression discontinuity designs (Blossfeld, 2009), but we briefly cover one
particular technique known as backdoor adjustment below (Pearl, 2009).
Backdoor adjustment involves identifying what are known as backdoor paths. An example of a
backdoor path between x0 and y in Figure 4(b) is x0 ← x2 → x3 → y. x2 and x3 are therefore
part of what is known as the backdoor adjustment set; a set of variables which, if adjusted for, block
the backdoor path. We can adjust for all the backdoor variables, or the minimal set sufficient to
block the path (in our case, either x2 or x3 will do). Including x0 and x3 yields θˆ = 2.00.
We have now recovered an unbiased estimate of the effect of x0 on y (which was approximately
equal to two), and we only needed to regress y onto two variables, despite our world knowledge
dictating that at least eight were involved in the data generating processes as a whole (indeed, all
variables in this simulation are highly and significantly correlated with the outcome). If we are
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also interested in the mediation through x1 then we can undertake separate regressions to break
the problem down. The estimated parameters are then meaningfully interpretable insofar as they
correspond with the parameters in the true data generating process. In other words, if θ = 2, then
every unit increase in x0 results in two units increase in y.
DOES TIME HELP?
Researchers may believe that the inductive bias imposed with the directionality of time is helpful
in identifying the causal effect and correctly specifying a causal model. Indeed, the fact that time
cannot flow backwards does constrain the possible directions of our arrows in our c-DAG, and there-
fore reduces the complexity of a time series model. However, in spite of the fact that a time series
model may be the only way to answer a certain causal question, time series models may be far more
complex than cross-sectional models, owing to the introduction of the additional time dimension.
Therefore, certain causal questions may only be answerable by considering time, but the causal ef-
fect of interest may be considerably harder to identify as a result. Figure 5 depicts a simple scenario
with two variables, x and y, and a hidden confounder z. Each variable influences its own future as
well as the future of the other variable. In the presence of the unobserved confounder the causal ef-
fect between x and y (however this might be defined) is unidentifiable. The complexity of this graph
could grow further still if we include causal arrows between x and y (and potentially z) for the same
time point (i.e., x and time one influences y at time one), or if we add any additional (un)observed
variables. In spite of the restriction that the arrows cannot flow backwards, this structure therefore
has the potential to be immensely troublesome from the point of view of identifiability. Indeed, the
use of causal inference with time series phenomena is a very current and ongoing research topic
in the fields of causal inference and machine learning (Peters et al., 2017; Krishnan et al., 2017;
Lohmann et al., 2012). Interested readers are pointed to an accessible introduction of the topic, and
its use in psychology, by Gische et al. (2020).
CHALLENGES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF CAUSAL MODELING
It is worth emphasizing that, with only naive multiple linear regression models, we were unable
to acquire a meaningful effect size estimate for non-trivial data generating process. Indeed, we
used a relatively simplistic synthetic simulation to demonstrate that multiple linear regression yields
meaningless estimates, but in real-world applications the graph may actually be significantly more
complex which makes it extremely challenging to correctly specify the structure of the c-DAG, and
therefore to use techniques such as backdoor adjustment.
More generally, it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable effect size estimates from observational
data concerning complex real-world social phenomena using these techniques. Indeed, the infamous
‘crud’ factor, which describes the fact that “everything [in social science] correlates to some extent
with everything else” makes causal inference in social science and psychology particularly challeng-
ing (Meehl, 1990; Orben & Lakens, 2020).5 One challenge relates to the identification of suitable
backdoor adjustment variables, as well as other structural entities such as colliders, mediators, in-
strumental variables, proxy variables etc. in order to facilitate the identification of the causal effect
using the observed data (for techniques, see e.g., Cinelli et al. 2020; Rubin 2005; Imbens & Rubin
2015; Angrist & Krueger 2001; Pearl 2009; Wang & Blei 2019; D‘Amour 2019). Another challenge
relates to the fact that social scientists are often concerned with the study of complex social systems
with dynamic interdependencies. Such systems may not exhibit readily identifiable cause and effect
pairs (Blossfeld, 2009).
In the same way that we chose to identify a single causal effect using the backdoor adjustment
method, it may be beneficial for researchers to attempt to simplify their causal research questions.
For example, in contrast with the typical use of SEM in psychology and social science (where the
researcher attempts to derive multiple effect estimates simultaneously), targeted learning adopts the
philosophy by ‘targeting’ a specific causal effect of interest, and orienting the analysis around its
estimation using machine learning to reduce misspecification (van der Laan & Rose, 2011). The ‘no
free lunch theorem’ familiar to machine learners applies here: causal inference yields the most in-
formation, but it is not easy (Wolpert & Macready, 1997). Attempting to undertake inference across
5The crud factor also results in an abundance of meaningless statistical significance, owing to the fact that
null-effects are practically non-existent in social phenomena (Meehl, 1990).
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multivariate, complex, linear SEM graphs is therefore extremely ambitious in light of its limited
functional form and likely misspecification, and is highly unlikely to yield meaningful estimates.
That said, exploratory work can still be highly valuable (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). Part of the
development process for SEMs (or, more generally, the underlying theory about the phenomenon)
could involve causal directionality tests and validation via causal discovery techniques from machine
learning (Peters et al., 2017; Scholkopf, 2019). Such techniques, at least in restricted circumstances,
may be able to test the directionality of the causal effects (Goudet et al., 2019; Mooij et al., 2010),
identify backdoor adjustment set variables (Gultchin et al., 2020), estimate the magnitude of causal
effects using flexible function approximation techniques (Yoon et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2019), or infer
hidden confounders from proxy variables using variational inference (Louizos et al., 2017a; Vow-
els et al., 2020). We recommend both Targeted Learning (van der Laan & Rose, 2011) as well as
deep latent variable neural network models (Louizos et al., 2017a; Vowels et al., 2020) as possible
approaches to the significant problem of causal effect size estimation, although many others exist
(Gultchin et al., 2020; Shalit et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2020; Yao et al., 2018).
Even once a researcher believes that they have accounted for the difficulties described above, and
have simplified their research question or hypothesis, their consequent estimations then rest on the
assumption known as ignorability; that there are no further latent/unobserved factors that have yet
to be accounted for. Figure 4(c) depicts the presence of an unobserved confounder z. Particularly
in cases where researchers are dealing with observational (as opposed to experimental) data, the
assumption of ignorability may be strong, untestable, and unrealistic. Other assumptions may also
be relevant, depending on the causal question being asked, such as the stable unit treatment value
assumption and the positivity assumption for estimating treatment effects. It is important researchers
familiarize themselves with all relevant assumptions and limitations before undertaking causal in-
ference, and make them explicit in their work (e.g., when they use SEM) (Grosz et al., 2020).
Finally, the simulations here assumed linear and additive structural equations of the form: x1 :=
θ0x0+U1. However, and as discussed earlier, c-DAGs are general and do not restrict the functional
forms relating the variables. Indeed, in real-world scenarios the assumption of linearity may impair
the capacity of the model to estimate unbiased coefficients, in much the same way as it limited
predictive models (Coyle et al., 2020; van der Laan & Rose, 2011; van der Laan & Starmans, 2014;
van der Laan & Rose, 2018). The difficulties of effect estimation are therefore compounded by the
difficulties associated with identifying an appropriate functional form for the dependencies between
variables (i.e., identifying what Blossfeld 2009 calls “effect shapes”). Unless the structure of the
model and its functional form sufficiently match those of the true data generating process, and we
have an identifiable causal effect, the model may be misspecified and uninterpretable.
PART 2 SUMMARY
We described how difficult it is to obtain reliable causal effect size estimates, and we have also
demonstrated how a failure to consider the causal structure may yield biased, meaningless effect
sizes, regardless of whether the researcher adopts a predictive or causal approach. We provided
one example of a causal inference technique known as backdoor adjustment, as a way to identify
the causal effect of interest. Doing so enabled us to simplify the analytical problem from one of
estimating all path coefficients in a complex graph, to one of estimating a specific effect by identi-
fying variables from an adjustment set. In practice, identifying these backdoor variables represents
a significant challenge, because it requires sufficient causal knowledge. Causal inference rests on
a number of strong assumptions, perhaps the strongest of all being that of ignorability: That there
are no unobserved confounders. Finally, researchers must also consider the functional form used
to represent the causal dependencies between the variables. As such, problems with identifiability,
ignorability, misspecification due to incorrect structure, and misspecification due to limited func-
tional form have the potential to compound each other. In summary, it is important that researchers
recognize the significant difficulties associated with estimating meaningful causal effects with ob-
servational data.6
6Given the complexity associated with avoiding misspecification, on top of considering functional form,
readers may come to the conclusion that causal inference should be reserved for Randomized Controlled Trial
(RCT) and experimental contexts. The common view is that RCTs represent the “gold standard” of research.
However, a growing literature highlights the limitations of RCTs, and how observational studies may, at least
in certain circumstances, represent a promising alternative, particularly in terms of lower cost, reduced ethical
implications, and larger sample size (Frieden, 2017; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018; Bothwell et al., 2016; Jones
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PART 3: UNRELIABLE INTERPRETATIONS
In this part, we introduce explainability and interpretability, and describe how misspecified models
with limited functional form may be neither explainable, nor interpretable. When the complexity of a
model is increased to mitigate the issue of limited functional form it may be nonetheless explainable
in spite of possible misspecification due to incorrect structure. We discuss a range of problems
relating to conflated and unreliable interpretations in psychology and social science. In our view, the
conflation arises not just as a result of the alleged taboo against causal inference (Grosz et al., 2020),
but also due to an apparent lack of understanding concerning the limitations associated with the
interpretability of misspecified models with limited functional form and/or incorrect causal structure.
EXPLAINABILITY AND INTERPRETABILITY
Scrutinizing the parameters of a model in a predictive sense is referred to as explaining, in that
we are explaining the behavior of the model, rather than interpreting the model’s parameters in
relation to some external real-world causal phenomenon (Rudin, 2019). We therefore distinguish
interpretability from explainability. In this paper we use the term interpretation to describe the
process of using a model to understand something about the structure in the data or phenomenon,
and the term is therefore of particular relevance to causal approaches. As we will show, linear
models are not immune to problems affecting interpretability both for reasons of limited functional
form as well as misspecification (see Parts 1 and 2). Explainability, on the other hand, refers to the
capacity to explain why a model makes a certain prediction or classification, based on its functional
form or algorithmic rules (Rudin, 2019), and is therefore a term particularly relevant to predictive
approaches. As the complexity of a model’s functional form increases, it becomes increasingly
difficult to either interpret or explain a model (Rudin, 2019).
THE (UN)INTERPRETABILITY OF LINEAR MODELS
Linear models are deceptively simple to explain because their model coefficients seem to provide a
direct means to understand why the model made a certain prediction. If the model is not misspecified
(i.e., it has adequate functional form and causal structure), then this parameter may be interpreted in a
causal sense as well as in a predictive/explainable sense. In other words, the parameter not only tells
us something about how the model’s output changes with respect to a change in its input, but also
something about the external phenomenon being modeled. However, if the model is misspecified
due to incorrect structure, then the parameter may only be used to explain the behavior of the model,
and will not correspond meaningfully with some external causal quantity.
Perhaps surprisingly, if the model is misspecified both in terms of its functional form and its struc-
ture, then the model may be neither interpretable nor explainable. In this scenario, complex can-
cellation effects may render the coefficients of linear models meaningless (Lundberg et al., 2020;
Breiman, 2001a; Haufe et al., 2014). Just because a predictive model (e.g., multiple linear regres-
sion) indicates that variable x1 has statistically significant association with an outcome, does not
imply that it is meaningful to interpret this coefficient either in terms of a specific quantified value,
or in terms of an ordinal level of variable importance. The problems are caused both by the func-
tion’s inability to account for non-linear relationships and by the mismatch of the function’s implicit
structural (i.e., causal) form with the true form of the data. We demonstrated the latter issue in
Part 2. For the former issue, we generate a synthetic example, closely following that of Lundberg
et al. (2020).7 Essentially, the relationship between the outcome and two particular features in a
semi-synthetic dataset is modified to include an increasing amount of non-linearity following the
relationships in Equation 3.
& Podolsky, 2015). Furthermore, in a social science context, randomized experiments may be practically
infeasible and potentially unethical (Blossfeld, 2009). To clarify, we do not wish to engage in a debate about the
merits and pitfalls associated with undertaking causal inference on experimental versus observational data, but
we do note that the perception of RCTs as representing a gold standard is potentially limiting and scientifically
unhelpful.
7Full code for the original example can be found here: https://github.com/suinleelab/
treeexplainer-study/.
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y = σ((1− q)(0.388x1 − 0.325) + q(1.714x21 − 1) + 1.265x2 + 0.0233) (3)
Here, σ is the logistic link function, q is the degree of non-linearity, which is varied between zero
(describing a linear relationship) and one (describing a model with a quadratic relationship), y is
the outcome, and x1 and x2 are the two predictor variables. The choice of the factors (e.g., 0.388)
and intercepts (e.g., −0.325) are arbitrary, and derive from the classic NHANES I dataset (Launer,
1994; Fang & Alderman, 2000) from which the predictors and outcome are drawn. The relationship
between the predictors and the outcome as q is increased from zero to one is shown in the lowest plot
of Figure 6. Two models were fit to these synthetic data: a linear logistic regressor, and a machine
learning algorithm known as XGBoost (Chen & Guestrin, 2016). The upper plot in Figure 6 shows
how the logistic regressor’s error increases as the non-linearity increases. In contrast, the XGBoost
model’s prediction error remains low. Notably, when q is close to zero (i.e., the percent non-linearity
is low), the linear model outperforms the XGBoost model, and has the potential to directly match
the data generating process. The middle plot shows how the contribution of irrelevant features to the
outcome changes as the non-linearity increases. For the XGBoost model, any irrelevant features are
ignored regardless of the degree of non-linearity, and their weights remain at zero (which is in line
with the true model). On the other hand, the linear model assigns weight (i.e., the coefficients of the
model change) to irrelevant features as the non-linearity increases. This is highly problematic for
explainability and interpretability - it results in irrelevant features being indicated to be of predictive
importance even when they are not.
Figure 6: The Uninterpretability of Linear Models in the Presence of Non-Linearity
x1
x2
y
Note. Demonstrates how the predictive performance of a logistic regressor drops as non-linearity increases,
whereas the XGBoost (Chen & Guestrin, 2016) model does not (top); shows how irrelevant feature attribution
increases with non-linearity for the linear regressor, but for XGBoost it does not (middle); the relationship
between variables in the dataset for these experiments becomes increasingly non-linear. These experiments
were close adaptations of those by Lundberg et al. (2020).
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THE (UN)INTERPRETABILITY OF MODELS WITH COMPLEX FUNCTIONAL FORM - CAMELS IN
THE COUNTRYSIDE
In Part 1 we suggested that researchers explore machine learning methods which facilitate the mod-
eling of complex, non-linear relationships between variables. These techniques are applicable to
predictive as well as causal approaches. In spite of their flexible functional form, powerful predic-
tive approaches are explainable but not necessarily interpretable. We now describe a famous example
which highlights how using powerful function approximation circumvents limitations in functional
form does not yield interpretable models. This is one of the principal limitations of purely pre-
dictive approaches and closely relates to misspecification (see Part 2). The example involves the
classification of images of cows and camels, where images of cows frequently feature countryside
backgrounds and images of camels tend to feature sandy or desert regions (Arjovsky et al., 2020).
A predictive function will not respect the orthogonality and semantics of the animal or background,
and the background provides a convenient cue, albeit one which is irrelevant and confounding, with
which to classify the animal. Hence, a cow in a desert may be wrongly classified as a camel, and a
camel with a countryside background may be wrongly classified as a cow. This issue may never be-
come problematic in practice, so long as the function is not exposed to a new distribution of images,
where the joint distribution of backgrounds and animals changes. This highlights how predictive
models, owing to their misspecification, are sensitive to what is known as covariate or distributional
shift. Given a change in the number of photographs of cows in desert regions, or camels in the
countryside, the performance of the classifier may suffer considerably.
This example concerning issues relating to classification of high-dimensional image data may ap-
pear somewhat unrelated to the typical data that psychologists are concerned with, but actually the
problem of confounding is just as important in the low-dimensional setting (Cinelli et al., 2020;
Rohrer, 2018). Indeed, predictive models are usually fit by minimizing an error criterion (e.g., mean
squared error or binary cross entropy), and there is therefore nothing to restrict these models from
leveraging any or all statistical correlations present in the data. The use of predictive model explain-
ability techniques (discussed in more detail below) can be used to help identify whether the model
might be leveraging factors which have the potential to be confounding, and can provide consider-
able insight. Unfortunately, if the confounders are latent/unobserved, then it may be very difficult to
identify and avoid such problems. Consequentially, predictive models are rarely interpretable.
LIMITED FUNCTIONAL FORM AND MISSPECIFICATION RESULTS IN CONFLATED AND
UNRELIABLE INTERPRETATIONS
The examples above highlighted that when the functional form of a model is limited in its capacity
to model the relationships between variables, the model coefficients become meaningless and the
model is unexplainable. A further problem arises when the model is misspecified for structural
reasons. The issues associated with limited functional form and causal misspecification therefore
compound to yield model coefficients that are (doubly) uninterpretable. Treating them otherwise
would be to interpret these coefficients as being causally meaningful, and this is an example of
conflated and unreliable interpretation. If the functional form of the model were correct (i.e., both
the model as well as the relationships between variables were linear), then a linear model would be
explainable, but not interpretable. This is because the outcome predicted by the model would indeed
be changing according to a βk change in the input variable xk, but owing to misspecification, this
βk would still not correspond with any causal quantity. As such, it is only when linear models are
neither misspecified due to limited functional form (compared with the true relationship in the data)
nor structurally misspecified, that they are interpretable.
EXPLAINABILITY TECHNIQUES
The ability to interrogate and explain our predictive models is important, particularly given that the
deployment of such models for automated decision making processes have the potential to seriously
impact individuals’ lives (Hardt et al., 2016; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Locatello et al., 2019; Cao &
Daume III, 2019; Liu et al., 2019; Howard & Borenstein, 2018; Rose, 2010; Louizos et al., 2017b;
Moyer et al., 2018; Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018). Indeed, the European Union has recently decreed
that the use of machine learning algorithms (which includes the use of predictive functions) be
undertaken in such a way that any individual affected by an automated decision has the right to
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an explanation regarding that decision (Aas et al., 2019; European Union, 2016). In the previous
section we described the camels in the countryside problem, whereby powerful predictive models
with flexible functional form do not respect causal structure in the data. However, complex models
(often called black box models) are more difficult to explain than linear models, and we therefore
need explainability techniques to do the explaining for us.
Model explainability is a burgeoning area of machine learning, in which commendable strides have
been made in recent years (e.g., Alaa & van der Schaar 2019; Wachter et al. 2018; Lundberg et al.
2020). The techniques facilitate a form of meta-modeling, whereby a simpler, human-interpretable
and thereby explainable model is used to represent the more complex, underlying model (Rudin,
2019). One popular explainability technique derives from a game theoretic approach to quantify-
ing the contribution of multiple players in a collaborative game; namely, Shapley values (Shapley,
1953). Recently, Shapley values have been adapted to yield meaningful explanations of models that
correspond well with human intuition (Lundberg & Lee, 2017; Lundberg et al., 2017; 2020; Sun-
dararajan & Najmi, 2020; Chen et al., 2020). Indeed, these methods were used with XGBoost in the
experiments demonstrating the problems with linear model interpretability above (Figure 6). The
family of Shapley methods provide breakdowns which indicate how much each input variable or fea-
ture contributes to a model’s prediction for any individual datapoint. Such individualized prediction
and explainability is particularly important for individualized treatment assignments (for example),
and thereby mitigates concerns regarding the use of aggregation in psychology and social science
(Bolger et al., 2019; Fisher et al., 2018). The methods can be used equally for complex functions
(such as neural networks) as well as for simple linear functions. By combining powerful function
approximation with explainability techniques, we may be able to achieve accurate forecasts and out-
come predictions, while maintaining the capacity to understand what our model is actually doing
when it makes a prediction.
From a research standpoint, explainability techniques allow researchers to understand, in a purely
associational sense, which variables and interactions between variables are important when making
a prediction. For example, if one identifies that a variable, previously considered to be important,
contributes negligible predictive value then one might investigate whether this variable does or does
not fit into a particular theoretical framework. We would therefore argue that researchers should con-
sider a combination of predictive methods with explainability tools as a useful means to contribute
new knowledge, particularly during the early and/or exploratory stages of investigation. It is, how-
ever, worth emphasizing that just because a predictive model finds a particular feature (ir-)relevant to
making a prediction, does not mean that this association is meaningful outside of the function/model
(as with camels in the countryside). Furthermore, an explainability technique represents a form of
model in its own right, and the process of modeling a model brings its own difficulties (see e.g.,
Rudin 2019; Kumar et al. 2020). Indeed, if the explanation model is good at explaining the data in
a simple, human-readable form, then the explanation model provides evidence that a simpler, more
explainable model was possible to begin with. These difficulties notwithstanding, the explainability
techniques provide a valuable means to leverage predictive model for exploratory research.
PART 3 SUMMARY
In Part 3, we have described how either limited functional form, or model misspecification, or both,
result in uninterpretable models. In such cases, any attempt to interpret the models in spite of these
limitations results in conflation and unreliability. The interpretations are conflated because a mis-
specified model cannot be interpreted causally, and they are unreliable because predictive models
can only be explained. This distinction is important because, if a misspecfication has occurred
(perhaps because we intentionally adopted a predictive/non-causal approach), one can restrict the
purview of scientific conclusions to the specific mathematics of the algorithm used for prediction.
In other words, powerful function approximation techniques may be able to accurately predict out-
comes and have the flexibility to match the functional form of the true data distribution, but they do
not necessarily respect or reflect the causal structure in the data generating process. Does this mean
that predictive techniques cannot generate understanding? Not entirely. There are many scenar-
ios, particularly during the exploratory stages of a research project, for which researchers may not
yet have a strong, empirically supported inductive bias or theory about the data generating process.
Rather than testing specific theoretical hypotheses during these early stages, it may be pertinent to
ask more general research questions. The goal may then be to amass varied evidence (e.g., by using
predictive models) to gradually uncover a basis for the development of an increasingly refined theory
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(Gelman, 2014; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Tong, 2019). Of course,
researchers should be transparent about whether this is their goal, and carefully consider how they
interpret (or indeed explain) predictive models. Model explainability techniques may be useful in
building up an intuition about ‘what is important’ in the phenomenon of interest. However, these
techniques are not without their own limitations, and we urge researchers to engage broadly with
experts in the practice of these techniques to ensure that (a) their approaches are optimal for their
research, and (b) that their interpretations (or explanations) are tempered according to the limitations
of their models.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The replicability crisis has drawn attention to numerous weaknesses in typical psychology and social
science research practice. However, in our view, issues relating to limited functional form, model
misspecification, and unreliable interpretations have not been sufficiently addressed in prior work.
Indeed, while it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantitatively apportion the crisis according to its
myriad causes, in our view the issues covered in this work represent significant contributing factors.
Our view is that, in general, researchers in psychology and social science lack some competence in
the practice of prediction and causal inference. If researchers were more competent at prediction,
they would avoid interpreting linear model parameters using implicit causal language (Grosz et al.,
2020), avoid using naive linear models to test causal hypotheses derived from causal theories, and
instead be using varied and flexible function approximation techniques, model explainability tools,
and train/test data splitting and/or cross-validation techniques (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). On the
other hand, if researchers were more competent in causal inference, they would be less ambitious
about specifying and interpreting large (causal) SEM graphs (which are almost invariably accepted
as valid a priori; VanderWeele 2020; Ropovik 2015), more restrained when it comes to interpreting
the coefficients of misspecified models, more transparent about assumptions when defining explana-
tory models (Grosz et al., 2020), use more explicitly causal language and terminology (Grosz et al.,
2020), more clearly distill and identify the specifics of their causal questions or hypotheses, and
be less likely to worsen the bias and generalizability of their inferences by adopting ad hoc, data
driven variable model manipulation techniques during the analysis stage. Finally, if researchers had
a clearer understanding about the differences between predictive and causal approaches, then we
would also see more delineation between the two. Typical practice therefore involves a combination
of unreliable interpretations regarding models with limited functional form and causal misspecifica-
tion.
1. We recommend that psychologists and social scientists give more consideration to predictive
approaches, particularly during the exploratory stages of a research project.
The inherent complexity and non-linearity of the typical phenomena of interest to psychologists
and social scientists may make the goal of causal inference arbitrarily complex (Meehl, 1990). This
may partly explain why researchers in psychology and social science are generally discouraged from
drawing causal conclusions from observational data, despite them doing so implicitly anyway (Grosz
et al., 2020; Dowd, 2011). Indeed, the use of SEM could be taken as evidence of an explicit intention
to undertake causal research, as the very structure of the model is an imposition of the researcher’s
view on the data generating process. The use of an explicit causal graph with opaque predictive
interpretations represents a further example of the conflation of predictive and causal approaches.
In cases where the models themselves are misspecified both in terms of linear functional form and
untestable structural assumptions, the interpretation of such models becomes unreliable.
When researchers wish to model the relationships between variables, either as part of a causal model,
or for purposes of prediction, then it may be extremely advantageous for them to consider techniques
common in machine learning, particularly in combination with model explainability techniques. In-
deed, Yarkoni & Westfall (2017) have previously made a similar recommendation. Powerful func-
tion approximation techniques including feature engineering or data-adaptive techniques such as
neural networks or random forests, can be used to leverage as many associations present in the data
sample as possible. In the case of predictive modeling, a consideration for the causal structure of the
data is possible but not necessary. Incorporating causal inductive bias may aid in generalization, but
it is not strictly necessary to achieve good predictive performance. Unfortunately, the use of tech-
niques with potentially data-adaptive, flexible functional form is extremely rare in psychology and
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social science, where the use of models with restrictive linear functional form is ubiquitous (Yarkoni
& Westfall, 2017; Blanca et al., 2018).
2. We recommend that psychologists and social scientists seek collaboration with statisticians and
machine learning engineers/researchers, whose principal focus is to understand, practice, and de-
velop function approximation and causal inference techniques. Given that there exist entire fields
dedicated to the study of relevant modeling approaches (e.g., statistics, machine learning, causal in-
ference), independently of the empirical human sciences, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect an expert
in psychology or social science, to have equal expertise in the practice of predictive and explanatory
modeling, particularly when the mathematical knowledge required to understand these techniques
is both significant and rare in these fields (Boker & Wenger, 2007). Furthermore, new methods
are continually developed and updated in the fields of statistics and machine learning. As well as
encouraging researchers to make themselves more familiar with the topics of predictive and causal
modeling, we also recommend they seek collaboration with experts in the practice of their chosen
analytical approach. Note that this recommendation has been made by researchers previously in
various contexts (e.g., Lakens et al. 2016).
3. We recommend researchers be transparent about whether they are adopting a predictive or causal
approach and to qualify their interpretations. We have discussed how unreliable interpretations may
stem from issues of limited functional form and causal misspecification, and how these issues may
be common in the fields of psychology and social science. We encourage researchers to ask them-
selves what an interpretation of an effect size or parameter derived using a naive (i.e., misspecified)
model actually means: Is it actually an explanation for how much the output of the model changes
with respect to a change in the input; or is it being interpreted causally (e.g., this childhood inter-
vention increased well-being by θ-amount)? In either case, researchers need to be transparent and
clearly articulate whether they are adopting a predictive or causal approach. Each approach is as-
sociated with assumptions and limitations which need to be clearly stated in order to contextualize
any explanations or interpretations which are made. Predictive model explainability tools have their
own limitations and may actually contradict the results from undertaking causal inference: While
the inclusion of a mediator in a regression can completely block a causal path reducing the estimated
effect to zero, a strong effect might be indicated by an explanation of a predictive model. Similarly
to Grosz et al. (2020), we therefore recommend that researchers clearly state their approach as well
as its associated assumptions and limitations, and moderate their explanations, interpretations, and
conclusions accordingly.
4. We recommend that researchers distill their research questions and hypotheses. It may be perti-
nent for researchers to attempt to distill and simplify causal questions so that they are both minimal
and sufficient. For example, in our discussion of causal inference, we chose to identify a single
causal effect, and for this it was sufficient to identify the minimal backdoor adjustment set neces-
sary to render this causal effect identifiable. As such, a full graph did not need to be specified,
even though it may need to be considered in order to find the backdoor adjustment variables. van
der Laan & Rose (2011) recommend a similar “targeted” approach. More generally, by distilling
our research questions and hypotheses, we may be able to increase the chance that our modeling
attempts are successful, and that we have realistic expectations of the level of understanding that can
be achieved. This recommendation therefore overlaps with the recommendation for transparency in
so far as distilling a research question or hypothesis will make it easier to be transparent.
While we have focused on the fields of psychology and social science, we feel the highlighted
issues are relevant to all empirical human sciences fields. There is little doubt in our minds that
the lack of understanding about the assumptions, limitations, and pitfalls associated with predictive
and explanatory modeling has contributed to the replicability crisis, and we implore researchers to
address these shortfalls, lest they hinder scientific progress. Every research question and hypothesis
may present its own unique challenges, and it is only through an awareness and understanding of
varied statistical methods for predictive and causal modeling, that researchers will have the tools
with which to appropriately address them.
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